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Naval blockade is an old form of warfare where the current restatement of customary international 
law on this issue – the 1994 San Remo Manual – leaves something to be desired. The article con-
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naval blockade and addresses also issues in relation to its enforcement.
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1. Introduction of the concept
A blockade might be defined legally as “an operation by a belligerent State to prevent 
vessels and/or aircraft of all States, enemy as well as neutral, from entering or exiting 
specified ports, airfields, or coastal areas belonging to, occupied by, or under the 
control of an enemy belligerent State”.1 
The purpose of a naval blockade is to help achieve the overall objective of the 
use of armed force – to get the enemy to agree to terms favorable to you – through 
undermining the enemy’s war effort by interdicting in- and outgoing maritime traf-
fic. Moreover, although blockades in earlier times were largely aimed at the economy 
of the enemy, today they are often an integral part of military operations directed 
against the enemy’s military assets.2 A blockade also “avoids the need to distinguish 
between the cargoes carried by neutral ships, and so overrides the law of contra-
band”,3 and it is the only measure of traditional naval warfare which makes it possi-
ble to interfere with enemy exports.4
The rules of naval warfare have always been a compromise between the interests 
of larger naval powers, as well as between these powers and states likely to remain 
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neutral during a naval encounter. As such, blockade law reflects naval tactics and 
strategies and is largely a product of customary international law developed over 
time “[t]hrough silence and acquiescence”.5 
Naval blockades must be differentiated from situations where a coastal state uses 
its powers under the law of the sea to enforce restrictions on the use of its territorial 
sea, in that zone itself and in its contiguous zone.6 An example of this would be using 
the authority granted by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) Art. 25 (3) to suspend innocent passage through a state’s territorial sea 
during ongoing hostilities. Thus, Sri Lankan restrictions, enforced in its territorial 
sea, on shipments to the Tamil Tigers were inherently different from a blockade.7 
Likewise, the government of Yemen could decide to prohibit the use of rebel held 
ports and suspend innocent passage through its territorial sea.8 By authorizing Saudi 
forces, the latter would be able to undertake enforcement in Yemeni maritime zones 
to the same extent that Yemen is itself entitled to do so.9
Moreover, a flag state interfering with a vessel flying its flag, even if it is a rebel 
vessel, is not a blockade.10 Occasionally, the term blockade is wrongly used in con-
nection with embargos, which at least partially differ from blockades, e.g. because 
they include landside restrictions on what may pass a border.11 Thus, criticism of the 
Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip largely centers on landside restrictions enacted by 
Israel, rather than the consequences of the seaside blockade.12 
A related concept is the nineteenth century custom of pacific blockade.13 A pacific 
blockade was used as a tool of reprisal in relation to breaches of international law 
undertaken by the party against whom the pacific blockade was established. The 
essential difference between this type of “blockade” and the regular one was the 
absence of an intention to establish a state of war between the involved states.14 One 
issue raised by this practice is whether a pacific blockade could be enforced against 
vessels of non-participating states.15 Another more fundamental issue is whether the 
use of force may ever be used for the purpose of reprisal.16 Hindering access to or 
from a foreign coast presumably constitutes a use of force, either through aggressive 
obstruction of the navigation of vessels, or through the use of boarding or similar to 
achieve compliance. The “quarantine” of Cuba in 1962 would seem to have a ques-
tionable legal foundation,17 especially as none of the well accepted exceptions to the 
prohibition on the use of force seems applicable. 
2. Historical development
Historically, blockades resembled maritime sieges.18 An early example of a maritime 
siege is the Athenian blockade in 425 B.C. of the island Sphacteria, which forced a 
Spartan garrison to surrender.19 A blockade was “considered an extension of invest-
ment of a fortress on land, and it was therefore not legally available in relation to 
unfortified ports, let alone a whole coastline.”20 The Dutch blockade of the Spanish 
Netherlands in 1584,21 and Grotius’ support for this, “translated the requirement 
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of siege into the more general one of effective denial of access to enemy territory or 
escape therefrom.”22 Thus, a blockade gave the right to capture all vessels seeking to 
break the blockade with corresponding entitlements to vessels and cargo.23 
As stated by Kraska, “[d]uring the eighteenth century, blockade became a rou-
tine practice in European conflict. But the difficulty of blockading long coastlines 
soon gave rise to the ‘paper blockade’, in which a nation might declare a blockade, 
but lack the naval force to effectively maintain it. The early Dutch blockades of 
England (1662) and France (1672–1673) and the Dutch–English blockade (1689) 
were regarded as paper blockades.”24
Traditionally, five requirements had to be met before a naval blockade could exist 
under international law:25 The blockade had to be established by one of the parties, 
be proclaimed by such a party, be effective, be applied impartially, and not hinder 
travel to and from any points of a neutral coastline. If these requirements were met, 
the blockading power was entitled – and obligated should the blockade be effective – 
to visit and search, capture, and in extreme situations destroy, vessels seeking to 
breach the blockade. 
Differences of opinion were most prevalent in relation to what constituted effec-
tiveness and the closely related issue of whether the blockading vessels could operate 
at a distance from the relevant coastline.26 Views on what constituted an effective 
blockade were typically divided into two camps. Firstly, there were those who held 
that the vessels upholding the blockade had to be stationed a few miles outside the 
relevant port so as to hinder the blockaded traffic. This is the so called “close-in 
blockade”,27 and France often supported this view.28 Secondly, there were those who 
merely required that the patrol was sufficiently close by – perhaps patrolling up and 
down the coastline – in order to make entry into the blockaded port or coastline 
risky.29 This view was held by the British. 
The British and continental positions on effectiveness did not reconcile until the 
Crimean War from 1853 to 1856,30 with this requirement being firmly establish in 
the 1856 Paris Declaration.31 This declaration is one of the first codification endeav-
ors of the law of blockade, largely seen as reflecting customary international law,32 
and defines effectiveness as “maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access 
to the coast of the enemy.” Although “there is little doubt that the principle was 
directed against the British doctrine that blockades could be established by cruiser 
squadrons”,33 the statement is indefinite and provides little help in identifying what 
would be necessary to “really […] prevent” the said access.34 A more lax formulation, 
found in British prize law, is that “the force must be sufficient to render the capture 
of vessels attempting to go in or come out most probable”.35 Here, “[t]he distance 
of the blockading vessels from the shore was determined by considerations of naval 
tactics rather than by some preordained or preconceived theory of law.”36 
Some traditional blockades were undertaken during WWI,37 like those of Mon-
tenegro in 1914 and German East Africa in 1915.38 Also, the British naval oper-
ations against Petrograd in 1919 - part of the British intervention in the Russian 
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revolution – is considered by some as a blockade.39 Ongoing technical develop-
ments, like longer-ranged coastal defenses, torpedo vessels and minefields,40 as well 
as submarines and military aircraft of diverse categories,41 increasingly made a close 
blockade feasible “only in the most exceptional of circumstances.”42 
This led to a prima facie floating of the said requirements during WWI by both the 
UK and Germany.43 Similar practices where undertaken by the major parties during 
WWII,44 where only the Russian blockade of Finland in 1940 would seem to have been 
a traditional blockade.45 However, the divergent practice was justified as reprisals,46 
and merely a minority holds that the concept of blockade has fallen into desuetude.47 
3. The current concept of naval blockade 
3.1 Newer uses and legal instruments
State practice after WWII has differed from the flexible notion of the world wars.48 
Although the Taiwanese closure of areas under the control of communist Chinese 
authorities in 1949 was not labelled blockade, and also took place within a civil war, 
the rules of relevance to the concept were nevertheless applied.49 Moreover, during 
the Korean War in the 1950s, a blockade was announced on 4 July 1950 whereby 
all merchant ships were barred from North Korean ports, whereas all warships – 
save North Korean ones – were allowed to pass to such ports.50 This allowance 
was presumably made to cater to the interests of the Soviet Union, but it stretched 
the concept of blockade greatly.51 In 1971, India blockaded the coast of then East- 
Pakistan, current Bangladesh, to block supplies to the Pakistani armed forces as 
well as stop their escape to sea.52 It would seem that “[s]everal merchant ships and 
small vessels were captured, and those ships which refused to obey the commands 
of the blockading power were sunk.”53 Mention should also be made of the Egyptian 
blockade in May 1967 of Eilat and the Gulf of Aqaba,54 and its 1973 blockade of Bab 
el-Mandeb.55 Likewise, the US applied something resembling a blockade to North 
Vietnam in May 1972 through the use of mines, although the term blockade was 
not officially used.56 Similarly, Iran’s blockade in 1980 of Shat-al-Arab, during the 
Iran-Iraq conflict, would seem to have been undertaken in conformity with the law 
of armed conflict.57 Blockade was also considered in connection with NATO’s attack 
on Yugoslavia in 1999, but some member states held that “this method of naval 
warfare was not a lawful option and would be too controversial”.58 The concept was 
however used by Israel in relation to the Gaza Strip from 3 January 2009 and cov-
ered a distance of 20 nautical miles from the coast.59 On 31 May 2010, the blockad-
ing force intercepted 6 vessels. On the largest of them, Mavi Marmara, the boarding 
force encountered more resistance than expected, with 9 casualties amongst the 
passengers and 55 passengers (one of whom died in 2014 after a four-year coma) 
and 9 Israeli soldiers injured.60 
The Declaration of Paris from 1856 and the unratified London Declaration of 
1909 are the only international legal instruments which seek to explicitly regulate this 
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field of law.61 The London Declaration is “a codification of the case law of 18th and 
19th century national prize courts, particularly English decisions during the Napo-
leonic Wars and American decisions resulting from the Civil War activities of Union 
naval forces.”62 The regulation on blockade in this declaration was largely regarded 
as customary international law at the outbreak of WWI.63 The term blockade is also 
mentioned in Article 42 of the 1945 UN Charter,64 as well as in Article 3 (c) of the 
1974 UN General Assembly resolution Definition of Aggression,65 although neither 
document defines the term.66 Naval aspects of the law of armed conflict are also 
indirectly recognized by UNCLOS Article 87 (1), 2nd sentence, which states that 
“[f]reedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Con-
vention and by other rules of international law.”
Current understanding of blockade, including its requirements, entitlements and 
consequences, is largely based on the London Declaration,67 and it is reflected in the 
San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea from 
1994.68 As will be shown, the current writer holds that the said Manual is in need of 
reassessment.
3.2 Some preliminary considerations
Is a state of war required before a blockade may be established?69 The short answer 
is that an international armed conflict (IAC) will suffice, although some scale or 
duration are presumably required.70 
In relation to non-international armed conflicts (NIACs), the concept of blockade 
has surfaced recently in relation to the “blockade” of Yemen by the Saudi-Arabian 
led coalition acting upon the invitation of the government of Yemen, against the 
Houthi rebels who currently control 30 % of Yemen.71 Blockade is generally under-
stood as inapplicable to NIACs, but may blockades be used in high intensity NIACs?72 
At best it may be said that “states have sometimes acknowledged or acquiesced 
in blockades targeting non-state actors”.73 The typically cited examples are the US 
Civil War and – perhaps – the Israel-Lebanon conflict in 2006,74 whereas examples 
against such use are typically the Spanish Civil War and the Algerian War of Indepen-
dence.75 In relation to the Spanish Civil War, it would seem that the nationalist party 
sought to establish a blockade,76 but that foreign states refused to have their vessels 
suffer such a measure,77 and actually established a “blockade” of Spain themselves 
in order to prevent foreign involvement in the civil war.78 
Tucker holds that “[i]n the absence of a recognized condition of belligerency nei-
ther the parent government nor insurgents can exercise belligerent rights against the 
vessels of third states on the high seas.”79 For the non-state party during a belliger-
ency scenario, it may only interfere with neutral shipping if the relevant neutral state 
“has –either explicitly or implicitly – recognized it as a belligerent”.80 As the Houthi 
rebels do not seem to have been recognized as belligerents by any state, it would 
then seem hard to argue for applying the concept of blockade to that conflict.81 Since 
some NIACs are considered international under Article 1 (4) of the 1977 Additional 
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Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, a somewhat corresponding consider-
ation to that of the belligerency scenario would limit the entitlement of the non-state 
party to interfere with neutral shipping.82 
Some hold that the Israeli blockade of the Lebanese coastline during its 2006 
armed conflict with Hezbollah should be considered an implicit recognition of bel-
ligerency,83 and this concept is similarly applied by some to the Gaza Strip from 
2009 onwards.84 However, Israel seemingly attributed the acts of Hezbollah to 
Lebanon in 200685 – thus making the conflict international – and Israel has been 
somewhat unclear as to whether it considers the armed conflict with Hamas as non- 
international or international.86 Also, there is state practice arguing against the use 
of blockade in a NIAC, and presumably also against it being used to transform that 
conflict into an international one. An example here is the Turkish reaction to the 
Gaza flotilla incident in 2010. In the Turkish report on the incident, blockade is held 
to apply only to IACs.87 Although it may be argued that the state of Palestine already 
existed at that point in time, something which would have turned the conflict into an 
international one as Hamas was the elected government,88 much of the discussion in 
the literature has been undertaken on the understanding that this was not the case. 
The Palmer Report took a slightly anomalous approach to this issue, arguing that 
the “specific circumstances of Gaza are unique and are not replicated anywhere in the 
world”, where Hamas as “the de facto political and administrative authority in Gaza”, 
fires or permits others to fire into Israel.89 The Palmer Report then turns to the issue 
of the intensity of the hostilities, stating that the armed violence “has all the trappings 
of an international armed conflict.”90 To a large extent, the Palmer Report would 
seem to concur with the views of Cassese,91 whereas it seems to misconstrue the San 
Remo Manual as applying blockade de lege lata also to NIACs.92 It is submitted that 
the concept of blockade is still – beyond situations of belligerency – limited to IACs.93
Nevertheless, the right to establish a blockade is not limited to states, as the UN 
Security Council may authorize such through its powers under Article 42 of the 
UN Charter. Such a blockade would have to be established and upheld by national 
military assets since the UN does not have such assets itself. To the extent that the 
Security Council does not explicitly deviate from the legal restrictions on blockades 
through its UN Charter Chapter VII powers, the ordinary rules will apply, although 
the concept of neutrality will have to be adjusted.94 
Another preliminary question is whether the entitlements granted and obligations 
incurred by a blockade may be activated without actually naming a naval operation a 
blockade. The need for clarity in international uses of armed force argues against this, 
but during the negotiation of the San Remo Manual the majority view was neverthe-
less that “the rules stated in these paragraphs [regarding blockade] were applicable 
to blockading actions taken by States regardless of the name given to such actions.”95 
One issue raised inter alia by Neff and the Turkish report is whether the principles 
of necessity and proportionality limit the way blockades may be carried out under 
traditional law.96 This presupposes that limitations found in current jus ad bellum, 
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especially the principles of necessity and proportionality, also restrict traditional 
concepts like blockade.97 Churchill and Lowe here hold that “[t]he best view seems 
to be that at least the principles, if not the detailed rules eo nomine, of the Laws of 
War and the law of neutrality apply to international armed conflicts.”98 This reflects 
the fact that neutral states tend to avoid criticizing a blockade in terms of jus in bello, 
but rather argue that it violates jus ad bellum.99 In other words, the application of a 
blockade – being as such a threat or an actual use of force under UN Charter Article 
2(4) – must find its legality jus ad bellum under one of the recognized exceptions to 
that prohibition: UN Security Council mandate, self-defense, or invitation by the 
territorial state.100 
Here, the UN Palmer Report found in relation to the 2010 flotilla incident that 
“stopping these violent acts was a necessary step for Israel to take in order to protect 
its people and to defend itself.”101 Moreover, “given the relatively small size of the 
blockade zone and the practical difficulties associated with other methods of mon-
itoring vessels (such as search and visit), the Panel is not persuaded that the naval 
blockade was a disproportionate measure for Israel to have taken in response to the 
threat it faced.”102 However, the Palmer Report also stated that “[a] naval blockade 
may only be maintained so long as it remains proportionate and a situation of armed 
conflict persists.”103 Thus, it has been claimed that Israel’s security needs did not 
require landside closure of the Gaza Strip and a seaside blockade of the same.104 
Also, the principle of proportionality has been alleged to imply that the blockade 
would have to be limited to certain kinds of merchandise, as well as limiting the 
blockading state’s power to divert the relevant vessels from the blockading area, as 
opposed to capturing and confiscating them.105 It is highly unclear whether state 
practice and opinion juris have given the principles of necessity and proportionality 
such consequences in relation to blockade.
3.3 Requirements
3.3.1 Declaration and notification
Although earlier there may have been two types of blockade – one of a factual kind 
and the other also requiring notification106 – current international law only acknowl-
edges blockade where notification is included. Previously, declaration of a blockade 
could be made by the commander of the blockading force acting on his govern-
ment’s behalf, but current communication technology will presumably lead to issu-
ance of such a declaration always being made by the relevant ministry of the said 
state. No reference to such a commander is made in the 1994 San Remo Manual, 
but it is mentioned in the 2015 US Law of War Manual.107 The declaration is also to 
be notified to neutral states, whereas the officer in charge of the blockading force will 
usually notify the local authorities of the blockaded territory.108 
The US Law of War Manual here notes that “[n]otification should include, as 
a minimum, the date the blockade is to begin, its geographic limits, and the grace 
period granted neutral vessels and aircraft to leave the area to be blockaded.”109 
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Beyond pointing out that these issues must be included,110 a declaration would pre-
sumably activate a blockade at 0000hrs on the date set, unless a different time is 
given. 
The customary granting of leave to neutral vessels was not mentioned in the Israeli 
blockade notification, but that is of little consequence as there were presumably no 
such vessels on the relevant coastline since it had no proper ports. Likewise, parts 
of the Arctic may see little traffic. Should there nevertheless be such vessels, the 
absence of this information will not invalidate the blockade as such,111 but rather 
grant such vessels a more flexible right to leave the blockaded port(s). 
The Turkish report holds that the Israeli declaration does not sufficiently 
indicate the “extent” of the blockade, as required by Rule 94 of the San Remo 
Manual.112 The explanation provided in the San Remo Manual is unhelpful – stat-
ing merely that “[t]his paragraph is self-explanatory.” As a blockade covers all types 
of cargo, and not merely those considered contraband, there is no obligation on the 
blockading power to issue a list of cargo prohibited from reaching the blockaded 
area.113 Presumably, the term “extent” would apply to any aerial dimension of the 
blockade, as opposed to the geographical part of the ocean covered by the naval 
blockade – the latter being covered by the term “location”. This since a block-
ade “need not be restricted to ships, it may also be applied and enforced by, and 
against, aircraft.”114 
Does international law require an indication up front of the duration of a naval 
blockade? Although it is not found in the London Declaration, this is required 
by inter alia the San Remo Manual115 and the Harvard Air and Missile Warfare 
Manual.116 It would seem that the Turkel Commission is correct in considering 
this to be merely an emerging rule of customary law.117 To a large extent the Israeli 
declaration of blockade will have to be understood as applying until further notice. 
As held by the Palmer Report, “[g]iven the uncertainties of a continuing conflict, 
nothing more was required.”118 
No specific form is needed for the notification of a blockade. What is important, 
however, is the effectiveness of the notification,119 and here the best result is achieved 
when multiple channels are used simultaneously. Traditionally, notification often 
took the form of diplomatic notes, but the issuing of Notices to Airmen or Notices to 
Mariners will suffice today.120 Direct notification of a state through diplomatic chan-
nels is now merely a measure for exceptional circumstances.121 The Palmer Report 
holds that the rationale of such notification is the need to “ensure that all potentially 
concerned parties are informed because a blockade must be enforced against all 
vessels, and its intentional breach has significant consequences”.122 
The 2015 US Law of War Manual notes that “[i]t is customary for the belliger-
ent State establishing the blockade to notify all affected States of its imposition,”123 
whereas the 1955 US Law of Naval Warfare referred to “all States”.124 It would 
seem that the newer formulation is narrower, although all states may be considered 
affected, so in practical terms there is little difference.
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Some presumptions of knowledge have been established in state practice. Of these, 
mention may be had of the blockade being common knowledge, and where the ves-
sel has left a port belonging to its flag state after the said state has been informed 
of the blockade.125 The London Declaration holds in Article 11(2) that having been 
informed by the commander of the blockading force, “[t]he local authorities will, 
in turn, inform the foreign consular officers at the port or on the coastline under 
blockade as soon as possible.” 
In a similar manner, changes to the blockade must also be declared and notified to 
the same audience.126 As regards the termination of the blockade, beyond situations 
where it is not effective anymore, this is done by giving notice of the termination to 
all states.127 In relation to the original understanding of the term “armistice”, the 
1913 Manual of the Laws of Naval War states in Article 92 that “[b]lockades estab-
lished at the time of the armistice are not raised, unless by a special stipulation of 
the agreement.” 
3.3.2 What may be blockaded?
Early on, blockade would seem to have been limited to enemy coastal fortifications,128 
but this soon expanded to one or a few enemy ports, followed by the whole of the 
enemy coastline, if the belligerent so wished.129 Although some hold that a blockade 
must cover the whole coastline of the state being blockaded,130 the better view is that 
a mere selection of port(s) or shorter stretches of the coastline will suffice.131 Like-
wise, any coastline under enemy occupation could also be covered. Thus, a blockade 
might include coastline belonging to the blockading state itself but occupied by the 
enemy.132 In civil wars where belligerency is recognized, coastline held by the rebels 
may similarly be blockaded. 
Also, a more vaguely defined area – “under the control of an enemy” – is found in 
the 1955 US Law of Naval Warfare Sec. 632 (a) and later restated in the 2015 US 
Manual on the Law of War Sec. 13–10.133 The meaning of this formulation is unclear.
Whether a state may blockade territory it occupies itself – e.g. the discussion on 
whether Israeli control over Gaza may still constitute occupation – is even more 
unclear.134 
An Arctic issue that arises would be the availability of blockade to larger ice-shelfs 
with base structures and similar located on them.
 As regards international straits and archipelagic sea lanes, these may only be 
blockaded if “the blockading power provides for safe and free passage of interna-
tional navigation and aviation not destined to the blockaded area”.135 
Although it is hard to say exactly how far from the blockaded territory a blockade 
cordon may be drawn, it would seem clear that the British and German “blockades” 
of large areas of the high seas during WWI and WWII were not in accordance with 
the limitations of blockade law as then and now understood. Today, a blockade will 
often cover parts of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), a zone which might extend 
as far as 200 nautical miles from the base lines. Few problems arise if the blockade 
Magne Frostad
204
overlaps with the EEZ of either the blockading or the blockaded state, whereas due 
regard must be shown to the interests of a neutral state should the blockade overlap 
with its EEZ.136 On the other hand, a blockade may not be enforced, nor proclaimed 
but enforced elsewhere, in relation to neutral territorial sea. 
It is often held that a blockade, “in view of its purpose to prevent access or entry 
by all vessels or aircraft, […] is by necessity located in sea areas beyond the territorial 
sea”.137 Probably reflecting this understanding, the 1939 Harvard Draft Convention 
on the Rights and Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War introduced a new 
concept entitled “blockade zone”, i.e. an “area of water extending fifty miles from a 
blockaded coast, proclaimed by a belligerent to be such a zone.”138 But if the block-
ading power is inclined to provide a close blockade within enemy territorial waters, 
it would seem strange if the option of blockade was unavailable. 
Nevertheless, some geographical areas are held to be excluded from the use of 
blockade. The Constantinople Convention of 1888 thus seeks in Article 1 to revoke 
the possibility of blockade in relation to the Suez Maritime Canal.139 Later events 
might be said to have made such a limitation on the use of blockade a casualty 
of war,140 although the closure of one’s own territory is an embargo rather than a 
blockade. Also, the 1936 Montreux Convention applicable to the Bosporus generally 
prohibits any of the signatory states from blockading these straits.141 As regards the 
Panama Canal, it was held in 1939, when the US was still in control of the Canal, 
that “[i]t is by no means clear that it would be illegal for a State at war with the 
United States to blockade the Panama Canal”.142 On the other hand, an obligation 
of permanent neutrality followed from the Hay-Pauncefote treaty between the USA 
and Great Britain,143 and this presumably prohibited blockade.144 A tendency may 
also be seen in case law to assimilate international canals of the kind mentioned 
above to the category of international straits.145
Also, limitations on the use of blockade in relation to the Svalbard island group 
and Bear Island are due to the Spitsbergen Treaty’s neutralization of the area.146 This 
limitation applies to state parties, but it is more uncertain whether the neutralization 
is part of international customary law. If the islands are used in violation of that neu-
trality by Norway or another state, there would presumably be a temporary lifting of 
this neutralization. If said activities constitute an armed attack on Svalbard, Norway 
is granted the right to respond in self-defense, e.g. by establishing a blockade of one 
or more of these islands. Also, a UNSC mandate would override the Spitsbergen 
Treaty. 
In a somewhat similar vein, the area covered by the Antarctica Treaty is both neu-
tralized and demilitarized,147 which would have excluded the possibility of blockad-
ing the British or Argentinian areas, partially overlapping, on the Antarctic Peninsula 
during the 1982 Falklands War. 
A different limitation on blockades follows from Principle 7 of the International 
Law Association’s 1998 Helsinki Principles on the Law of Maritime Neutrality: “If a 
port in one belligerent State is used for the purposes of transit to and from a neutral 
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landlocked State under any applicable international agreement or arrangement, the 
other belligerents shall not prevent ships carrying goods destined for, or exported 
by, the neutral landlocked State from leaving or entering the port. Nor shall the 
belligerent State through whose port such goods transit take measures to interfere 
with their passage other than in accordance with Article 125 of the UNCLOS.”148 It 
is unclear how such an exception could be implemented without undermining the 
effectiveness of the blockade, although one possibility is to let a neutral party handle 
the said cargo through the blockaded territory.
3.3.3 Where may enforcement take place?
Another issue is where the blockade may be enforced. This issue is regulated by 
Article 17 of the London Declaration to the effect that “[n]eutral vessels may not be 
captured for breach of blockade except within the area of operations of the warships 
detailed to render the blockade effective.”149 Parmelee finds that this, together with 
Articles 1 and 18 of the London Declaration, “definitely limit the area which may 
be covered by the operations of the blockading fleet”.150 This area was enlarged by 
the right of hot pursuit of blockade runners.151 
Naturally, the blockade may be enforced in the territorial sea of the blockading 
and the blockaded state. The first instance is especially relevant where the relevant 
states have a shared maritime border. 
Here, Guilfoyle holds that a “blockade may be enforced on the high seas even at 
a distance from the area of naval operations and prior in breach of any cordon.”152 
The issue of where a blockade may be enforced was considered in relation to the 
takeover of Mavi Marmara and other vessels bound for the Gaza Strip, but under-
taken 70–100 nautical miles from the coast.153 Interception at this distance was held 
to be legal in relation to the Gaza flotilla due to “(i) their location and announced 
destination; (ii) the public pronouncements by the flotilla organizers and partici-
pants regarding their intention to breach the blockade; and (iii) the refusal of the 
ships’ captains to accept the invitation to alter their course to Ashdod after they were 
warned by the IDF.”154 
This is different from the controversial concept of continuous voyage whereby 
a vessel carrying contraband, but en route for neutral territory, may be captured as 
long as the ultimate destination of the vessel, perhaps even the ultimate destination 
of the contraband cargo itself, is enemy territory.155 In 1939, the commentary to the 
Harvard Draft Convention held that “[w]hile the practice of States today is thus 
rather uncertain as to continuous voyage by sea, it is not believed that the appli-
cation of the doctrine of continuous voyage by land to blockade is permitted by the 
existing law. On the other hand, the application to blockade of the doctrine of con-
tinuous voyage by sea, even with transshipment, appears to have better support.”156 
It would nevertheless seem that state practice and legal writing – beyond those of 
Anglo-American states – are opposed to applying the doctrine of continuous voyage 
to blockades,157 as this would stretch the concept of effectiveness beyond its breaking 
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point.158 The Israeli interception of the merchant vessel Klos-C on the Red Sea in 
2014, with missiles allegedly bound for Gaza, could perhaps be construed as state 
practice backing a wider understanding of blockades.159 However, as the missiles 
were seemingly intended to be offloaded in Port Sudan and then smuggled through 
the Sinai Peninsula into Gaza,160 this was hardly enforcement of the blockade of 
Gaza, but rather an issue of contraband.161
Moreover, the right to enforce a blockade against vessels breaching or attempting 
to breach the blockade would seem to cease when the pursuit is abandoned, thereby 
making it illegal to apply the concept of blockade as grounds for capturing a vessel 
should one come across it at a later point in time.162 
3.3.4 Effectiveness
Effectiveness must be assessed from a factual point of view.163 The strength and posi-
tion of the force undertaking the blockade will depend on factual and geographical 
circumstances, requiring a separate assessment of every individual case.164 Obvi-
ously, a measurement of effectiveness cannot commence before a blockade has been 
declared, even if restrictions on maritime traffic were applied at an earlier point in 
time through other legal avenues.165 Nor will a paper blockade suffice. In the words 
of the US Law of War Manual, “the blockade must be maintained by forces that 
are sufficient to render ingress or egress of the blockaded area dangerous”.166 In the 
San Remo Manual, reference is made to a reasonable risk of effectively preventing 
ingress and egress of the blockaded coastline,167 and the main issue is always whether 
there is a real risk of being captured, but not destroyed, if one seeks to break the 
blockade.168 As a consequence, the occasional breach of a blockade does not prove 
that the blockade is ineffective, although it may be hard to identify when the number 
of breaches is sufficient to lift the blockade. Allied warships may help out in enforc-
ing the blockade, “even though the Allied State is not a party to the declaration of 
the blockade”.169 This might lead to operational challenges if the allies hold different 
views on e.g. the application of the doctrine of continuous voyage to blockades.
A blockade typically covers traffic on the sea and above it. Submerged traffic and 
traffic along the sea bed should be considered in an analogical manner.170 More 
unclear, however, is traffic under the sea bed through tunnels, either natural or man-
made, typically where the sea separating neutral and blockaded territory is narrow. 
Perhaps these latter instances should instead be covered by regulations regarding 
land closure. It would also seem that the prohibition on damaging submarine cables 
and pipelines, as long as these do not exclusively serve the other party,171 argues 
against a right and a duty to expand the blockade to such infrastructure. 
As regards tools which may be used to enforce a blockade, these include: ships, 
submarines, naval mines, aircraft, helicopters, and presumably also drones and 
cyber tools. These platforms must be of a military, as opposed to civilian, nature.172 
Normally, the upholding of a blockade would include both air and sea assets, and 
an assessment of effectiveness would then depend on their combined effect.173 The 
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point here is that the enforcement platform must be able to effect a capture either 
on its own or together with other military assets at the state’s disposal. The mon-
itoring of the area may therefore be undertaken by unmanned aerial or seagoing 
units, as long as ordinary weapon platforms are available to immediately respond 
to attempted breaches of the blockade.174 However, the San Remo Manual pro-
hibits “the enforcement solely by weapon systems, such as mines, unless they are 
employed in such a manner as not to endanger legitimate sea-going commerce.”175 
Von Heinegg thus holds that “[d]espite the obvious perils submarines and missiles 
pose to surface warships, in most cases the presence of at least one surface unit, 
for humanitarian reasons, remain an indispensable requirement for the legality of a 
naval blockade.”176 
Moreover, current military technology has led to agreement on the sufficiency of 
patrolling enforcement, as opposed to deployments off the relevant ports.177 Also, 
the same technological developments, including the extensive use of aircraft, have 
significantly increased the area where a single naval vessel can effectively uphold a 
blockade.178 
Jones finds that enforcement of a blockade may still be limited to surface ships,179 
although enforcement may also be undertaken against aircraft.180 However, it could 
be argued that if the blockade is to have any genuine effectiveness, it must also include 
an aerial blockade. Admittedly, the Harvard Draft Convention of 1939 applied the 
rules regarding blockade only vaguely to aircraft,181 and the commentary to the San 
Remo Manual states that it was “considered whether the fact that aircraft could still 
land within the territory of the blockaded belligerent would affect the effectiveness 
of a sea blockade. This was found not to be the case, as, on the one hand, transport 
of cargo by air only constitutes a very small percentage of bulk traffic and, on the 
other hand, the fact is that transport over land could take place without affecting 
this criterion.”182 True, aircraft do not transport cargo volumes comparable to larger 
cargo ships, but larger transport aircraft may nevertheless carry volumes of some 
significance.183 Also, landside transport is not relevant for islands. Here, von Heinegg 
would seem to hold that a mere naval blockade may lose its effectiveness if more 
than “a considerable small number of aircraft continue to land within the blockaded 
area”.184 Be that as it may, it comes as no surprise that state practice and opinion juris 
requiring an aerial dimension to the enforcement of a blockade is hard to find. 
Likewise, according to the Tallinn Manual, “the majority of the International 
Group of Experts concluded that it is reasonable to apply the law of blockade to 
operations designed to block cyber communications into and out of territory under 
enemy control.”185 Such cyber measures may also be used to enforce a naval and/
or aerial blockade,186 but cannot be understood as required in order to satisfy the 
requirement of effectiveness.
Both actual breaches of the blockade cordon and attempted breaches must be 
responded to. A breach may be defined as “the passage of a vessel or aircraft through 
a blockade”.187 An attempted breach would typically be vessels or aircraft departing 
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from a blockaded coastline, or on a course toward such ports or airports.188 Essential 
aspects in relation to both a breach and an attempted breach are knowledge of the 
blockade by the vessel/aircraft and an intention to evade it,189 e.g. not merely cross-
ing the cordon due to duress. The Anglo-American doctrine also holds that vessels 
anchored or hovering outside of the cordon in such a way that they may easily access 
the coastline, are to be considered as attempting to break the blockade.190 How-
ever, this must be differentiated from merely “[a] temporary anchorage in waters 
occupied by the blockading vessels” where an attempted breach must be based on 
additional grounds.191 
3.3.5 Temporary withdrawal
As held in the 2015 US Law of War Manual, “[t]he requirement of effectiveness does 
not preclude temporary absence of the blockading force, if such absence is due to 
stress of weather or to some other reason connected with the blockade (e.g., pursuit 
of a blockade runner).”192 Arctic winter storms are a prime example of this. However, 
this group of reasons must not be liberally construed, since this would make the line 
between existence and lifting of the blockade difficult to discern.193 It is questionable 
if a withdrawal due to the outbreak of contagious diseases or refueling would suffice. 
Also, the blockading entity must return within a reasonable time.194 
For a long time, there has been agreement that blockades are lifted when the 
blockading force is driven away by enemy forces.195 Jones furthermore holds that 
“[t]he failure to enforce the blockade against vessels escorted by warships of either 
the blockaded state or non-participating states renders the blockade ineffective.”196 
This goes to show that the blockading force should have sufficient military capa-
bilities to undertake warfare should enemy warships arrive at the scene, and that it 
cannot merely consist of de jure warships which are de facto mere auxiliary vessels, 
capable only of undertaking non-resisted boarding. A blockade is also terminated if 
the blockading power states so, or more generally when it is no longer enforced in 
an efficient manner. 
As a practical matter, it might be unclear to a neutral master whether a blockad-
ing force has left its cruising station due to inclement weather etc., or due to enemy 
military operations – the reason nevertheless having consequences for whether the 
blockade has been lifted or not.197
3.3.6 Special privileges 
The San Remo Manual and the US Law of War Manual also recognize that other 
“exceptions” may be made to the requirement of effectiveness, namely in relation to 
so-called special privileges.198 
Here, the essential point is that neutral warships, military aircraft or vessels in 
evident distress have no right to enter such a port,199 but that consent to such entry 
does not make the blockade ineffective.200 Such licensing of particular vessels must 
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be made without distinction to the flag,201 although enemy ships are not covered by 
this privilege. 
This privilege also covers neutral vessels and aircraft carrying relief supplies – an 
understanding which has been recognized since at least the Napoleonic wars.202 If 
such consent risks undermining the effectiveness of the blockade, the blockading 
power would have little motivation to uphold its obligation under the law of armed 
conflict in relation to enemy civilians, as reflected in Rules 103 and 104 of the San 
Remo Manual. Presumably, an analogy would apply to a population in need of evac-
uation due to natural catastrophes like hurricanes or volcanic eruptions.
3.3.7 Period of grace
Neutral ships in blockaded harbors were usually granted 15 days of grace.203 As this 
period is “too long under modern conditions”,204 it is often reduced to 24 hours.205 
Here, “[t]he grace period is not uniform, but depends upon an assessment by the 
blockading belligerent as to what is reasonable under the circumstances.”206 If there 
are no such vessels or aircraft in the blockaded ports or airfields, no period of grace 
is required.207 This would presumably often be the case in Artic ports and airfields.
3.3.8 Neutral ports and coasts
The blockade must “not bar access or departure from neutral ports or coasts.”208 
This is typically an issue when a neutral coastline lies beyond enemy held entrance 
to a bay. Likewise, in a case where an enemy has blockaded Greenland and Iceland, 
the blockading power would still have to let neutral vessels bound for neutral Canada 
pass through the Denmark Strait. To bar access or departure is, however, different 
from regulating such access or departure due to military necessity, e.g. by establish-
ing corridors or convoys. If no such corridor has been established, it would seem 
proper to let neutral warships convoy neutral merchant vessels to a neutral port. 
Green nevertheless exempts from this neutrals involved in un-neutral conduct.209 
3.3.9 Impartiality
The San Remo Manual and the US Law of War Manual require blockades to be 
applied in an impartial manner to vessels and aircraft of all states.210 This includes 
vessels and aircraft flying the flag of the blockading state.211 The issue is linked to that 
of effectiveness since the enemy could otherwise more easily avoid the consequences 
of the blockade,212 whereas partiality would favor some states, e.g. the blockading 
state’s own merchant marine,213 at the cost of others.214 The consequence of breach-
ing this obligation is a lifting of the blockade.215
3.3.10 Objects essential for survival and the evaluation of excessiveness
Additional requirements for establishing a blockade are mentioned in Rule 102 of 
the San Remo Manual,216 prohibiting a blockade which has as its sole purpose to 
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deny the civilian population objects essential for survival (litra a), or would contra-
vene the excessiveness evaluation of collateral damage (litra b).217 Litra a thus consid-
ers an issue of intention, whereas a point of debate is whether litra b only covers the 
consequences of the naval blockade, or whether the excessiveness evaluation must 
also include the hardships following a landside closure like that of the Gaza Strip. 
Views differ strongly on the latter issue.218 
In the past, blockades have been used to starve the enemy, e.g. the Confederacy 
during the American Civil War and the Germans during World War I and II.219 The 
law of armed conflict now prohibits starvation of civilians as a method of war,220 and 
where a blockade has the unintended effect of causing starvation of the civilian pop-
ulation, a somewhat circumscribed obligation exists to let relief shipments pass.221 
The excessiveness issue was held to undermine the right of Israel to establish a naval 
blockade off Gaza by the UN Hudson-Phillis Mission in 2010.222 Not surprisingly, 
this assessment of the facts differed strongly from that of the Turkel Commission.223 
In all fairness, it is difficult to sufficiently establish that Israel had as its sole purpose 
to starve the population of the Gaza Strip,224 and it is also difficult to establish that 
disproportionate civilian damage or suffering followed from the blockade on its own, 
compared to the military advantage of blockading the said coastline.225 However, to 
the extent that the assessment would be on the one hand the smuggling of weapons 
and hostile persons, and on the other the totality of the land and seaside closure of 
the Gaza Strip, the proportionality test might receive a different outcome.226 
In the Arctic, fuel etc. for heating purposes may often be considered objects essen-
tial for the survival of the civilian population, and thus covered by litra a.
Moreover, should a situation actually obligate the blockading power to let human-
itarian aid pass, such transport through the blockade cordon would be subject to 
technical arrangements and conditions.227 More generally, the Palmer Report holds 
that “[t]he imposition of a blockade must have a lawful military objective”.228 Thus, 
“[a] blockade would consequently be illegal if imposed with the intention to collec-
tively punish the civilian population.”229 As regards medical supplies for the civilian 
population, this is regulated by Rule 104 of the San Remo Manual.230 
3.3.11 Visitation and the use of force
An integral part of the right to establish a blockade is the right to search and visit 
vessels reasonably suspected of attempting to breach the blockade.231 Without it, the 
blockading power would be unable to effectively control and enforce the blockade.232 
Von Heinegg finds that “[i]t is doubtful whether [liability to capture] continues to 
be valid today. In any event, the capturing State is entitled to repress the aircraft or 
vessel for the duration of the international armed conflict.”233 It would seem that 
here he is applying the proportionality principle of jus ad bellum.
During the Indian blockade of East-Pakistan in 1971, Indian forces attacked and 
sunk vessels not complying with the orders of the Indian forces.234 Likewise, Posner 
holds that “[s]hips that run blockades may be attacked and sunk under international 
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law”.235 On the other hand, Guilfoyle states that “[s]tartlingly, the laws of naval war-
fare provide no positive guidance on the use of force in capturing neutral merchant 
vessels. One must suggest that the appropriate analogy then is the law-enforcement 
paradigm as it applies in other [jus in bello] situations such as maintaining order 
during an occupation.”236 
As regards neutral vessels, the use of force must be “indispensable to enforce the 
right of control, in particular to prevent a merchant ship from evading such con-
trol. The destruction of the neutral merchant ship is permissible only in exceptional 
circumstances, because a warship will generally have other means at its disposal to 
enforce its right of control.”237 Use of force is also regulated by the International 
Law Association in Principle 5.1.2 (3) of the 1998 Helsinki Principles on the Law 
of Maritime Neutrality: “Merchant ships flying the flag of a neutral State may be 
attacked if they are believed on reasonable grounds to be […] breaching a blockade, 
and after prior warning they intentionally and clearly refuse to stop, or intentionally 
and clearly resist visit, search, capture or diversion.”238 An almost identical phrasing 
is used in Rules 67 (a) and 98 of the San Remo Manual.239 
In order to be clearly refusing and clearly resisting visitation, the vessel must act in 
a way which “has, or may have, an impeding or similar effect on the intercepting 
forces. Therefore, a mere change of course in order to escape is not sufficient.”240 
Following such resistance, the vessel becomes a military objective through its pur-
pose or use, where destruction provides a definitive military advantage as it preserves 
the effectiveness of the blockade.241 
Due to the need to take precautions, as mentioned in Rule 46 of the San Remo 
Manual, any attack must follow a prior warning.242 Explicit radio warnings stating 
that force will be used unless the vessel stops and allows boarding might help to clar-
ify and deescalate the situation.243 The Palmer Report holds it advisable that “warn-
ings should be given in a variety of ways, and they should be repeated, so there is no 
possibility of misunderstanding. If force is going to be used and the use of that force 
is imminent, that fact must be plainly communicated and indicated to those against 
whom it is proposed to act. […] Force once used must be kept to the minimum nec-
essary, proportional and carefully weighed against the risk of collateral casualties.”244
Thus, the resistance to boarding mounted by persons onboard the Mavi Marmara 
– according to the Turkel Commission’s conclusions – rendered the vessel a mili-
tary objective, although the Israeli authorities decided not to attack the vessel.245 As 
regards how persons onboard such a vessel should be considered; they typically fall 
into two categories: civilians directly participating in hostilities (often the crew) and 
ordinary civilians (most or all of the passengers). In relation to the latter group, the 
prohibition on excessive collateral damage must be respected.246 However, making 
an assessment of whether or not persons onboard the vessel are directly participating 
in hostilities is difficult, specifically in relation to the belligerent nexus requirement 
of the ICRC.247 The use of force must then differentiate between combat operations 
against those participating directly in hostilities (with the rest considered civilians 
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at risk of suffering collateral damage), and the use of police powers against the rest. 
In some extreme situations, this might require the boarding party to withdraw and 
reassess the situation, should excessive collateral civilian damage seem plausible, or 
the “rioting” civilians require a more robust police power approach than initially 
expected.248 
As regards the use of force against neutral warships breaching a blockade – should 
they be denied leave to pass by the blockading forces – this is presumably limited to 
situations of self-defense. It would seem like the ordinary reaction to such breaches 
of a blockade is to file an official protest with the said neutral state.249 
4. Developing the law
Against the background of the alleged use of blockade in Yemen and the possibilities 
of a new blockade of North Korea, it might be proper to use this momentum to seek 
a clarification of the law through a new instrument. Alas, the development of the 
legal restrictions on naval warfare, and for that matter aerial warfare, have differed 
from that of the law applicable to land warfare in one particular manner: It has 
largely been a matter of customary international law. Although the need for a new 
binding instrument in this area has been raised since at least the early 1980s, Roach’s 
caution in 2000 is just as sound today.250 Should such an exercise become more than 
a paper product of relevance merely to states with little interest in naval warfare, it 
would have to include the major naval powers and the end result would have to be 
acceptable to the majority of these.251 Thus, it would seem easier to succeed with 
instruments of a more narrow focus, like contraband or blockade, but interlinkages 
between issues of naval warfare might mitigate against even such a compartmental-
ized endeavor. 
The origin of naval blockade lies far back in time, and the concept has been further 
developed to include new modes of crossing the cordon.252 It is only to be expected 
that blockades will continue to adapt to new technical and tactical developments, 
but such changes will only muddy the water more if no proper reassessment of the 
customary international law of blockade is undertaken. There is at the very least a 
need for an updated chapter on naval blockade in the San Remo Manual,253 with far 
more elaborate comments than are provided today.
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